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Abstract 
 
The increased availability of panel data has made it possible to estimate and measure health 
mobility for population subgroups who may have systematically different levels of 
mobility.  The objective of this paper is to stimulate discussion on what estimated 
differences across subgroups may mean for resource allocation.  We use a straightforward 
hypothetical example to investigate the implications of different levels of health mobility 
on health outcomes, considering in addition the effects of adaptation to illness over time.  
We also discuss some of the ethical and political implications of health mobility.  
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Introduction 
 
Every health system aspires to implement health policies which can achieve the best 
possible health and wellbeing for the population.  This requires decisions on how to 
allocate scarce resources among competing subgroups.  Such decisions are complicated by 
the fact that the health of populations and the relative disadvantage of certain subgroups 
change over time (Cutler and Richardson, 1998).  For example, analysis of mental health in 
the UK shows that low income groups and minority ethnic groups experience similar levels 
of mental illness at a point in time in terms of prevalence (Hauck and Rice, 2004).  
However, when investigated over time, these two disadvantaged groups are not similar: 
Individuals with low incomes tend to experience mental health problems of a long-lasting 
nature, whereas individuals from minority ethnic groups experience great fluctuations in 
their mental health, and thus in ‘health mobility’.  To take this a stage further, suppose a 
policy maker wants to implement a mental health program, targeted at these two subgroups, 
shown to be at risk of mental illness.  How should resources be allocated between the two 
groups?  Are they both equally badly off, as suggested by analysis undertaken at a point in 
time?  This would imply that, other things such as costs being the same, they should attract 
an equal share of resources.  Or, is one group comparatively worse off than the other?  If 
so, which one is worse off, and how can efficient and equitable resource allocation 
decisions be made?   
 
The increased availability of panel data has made it possible to estimate and measure health 
mobility for different subgroups who may have systematically different levels of health 
mobility.  The objective of this paper is to stimulate discussion concerning potential 
differences in health mobility between subgroups, and what they may mean, for 
individuals, for society and for policy makers.  We use a straightforward hypothetical 
example and simulated data to investigate the implications of different levels of health 
mobility on resource allocation, considering in addition the effects of adaptation to illness 
over time.  We find that different scenarios on the level of health mobility and type of 
adaptation lead to very different implications for resource allocation across different sub-
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populations. The hypothetical example we give suggests a framework for future analysis in 
this area taking account of health mobility and adaptation.   
 
 
Health Mobility 
 
Cross sectional studies on population health are often used to determine prevalence rates 
and to explain differences in these across subgroups, at a certain point in time.  For 
example, a study on the mental health of young Australians finds that 27% of 18-24 year 
olds suffer from a mental health disorder (ABS, 1997).  This might be due to (a) each 
individual having a 27% chance of suffering ill health, in any given year, or (b) 27% 
suffering from ill health all the time (and 73% never) or (c) something in between, so that 
of the 27%, (say) 10% will experience ill health in repeated time periods, and the rest 
(17%) are ill for one time period only.  Case (a) has high health mobility1; (b) has no health 
mobility; and (c) intermediate health mobility.  Panel data can be used to test the extent of 
such health mobility, tracking individuals over time (Jones and Lopez, 2004; Jones et al 
2006; Hauck and Rice 2004, Hernández-Quevedo 2006; Lecluyse and Cleemput 2006). 
 
Assume a situation where people can be either healthy or ill (and there are no births or 
deaths).  As with incidence and prevalence, health mobility is determined by the proportion 
of healthy individuals becoming sick.  As with prevalence, but unlike incidence, health 
mobility is determined by the proportion of sick individuals who become healthy.  Unlike 
both incidence and prevalence, health mobility reflects the number of consecutive periods 
individuals remain in one health state or the other.  In addition, unlike both incidence and 
prevalence, health mobility can be used with categorical (with three or more levels of 
health) or continuous health measures to reflect the magnitude of change in health states 
(Lecluyse and Cleemput 2006).  If changes are large (small), health mobility is 
                                               
1 Some may term this dynamics, we use the term health mobility to avoid confusion with the habit formation 
literature, and dynamics and lags.  We are not referring to functional mobility, but mobility between health 
states.   
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consequently high (low).  A measure of mobility collapses these factors into a single 
summary measure, which allows comparison of mobility across different subgroups.  
 
Jones et al. (2006) identify the factors which may influence the extent of health mobility.  
Low health mobility can reflect the nature of prevalent health problems: some illnesses are 
inherently chronic, and therefore associated with lower mobility.  Individuals may have 
characteristics which are persistent over time and predispose them to worse health, 
contributing towards lower mobility.  These characteristics can be observed socioeconomic 
characteristics, or unobserved factors such as genetic predisposition or risk attitude.  
However, even observationally identical individuals may still experience different health 
states.  This can be explained by state dependence, which describes a phenomenon whereby 
a cumulative history of a range of health problems may directly affect current health.  
Given all of these factors, we hypothesise that not accounting for health mobility may mean 
policy makers do not have full information on the effects of illness on sub populations, 
which may lead to the misallocation of resources in certain circumstances.   
 
 
Health mobility: A hypothetical example 
 
We use valuations of health or health related quality of life (HRQOL) on a scale with 1 for 
full health and 0 for dead.  We consider a sample of 180 persons over 9 time periods.  In 
each period, 20 are sick and 160 are healthy.  For simplicity, we assume HRQOL are the 
same for each sick individual within a subgroup.  We also assume the levels of HRQOL are 
comparable and can be aggregated across individuals, and over time.  We initially calculate 
aggregate QALYs for three hypothetical subgroups with no, intermediate and high health 
mobility, respectively.  With high mobility, each person in the sample is sick for one time 
period only, so that those sick (n=20) change after each period.  With no mobility the same 
20 are sick in each time period, and the other 160 are healthy throughout.  For intermediate 
mobility, we assume that 10 are sick for the whole time period, and 10 persons are sick for 
one time period only.   
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In order to make our example more realistic, we also consider the possibility that patients 
may adapt to illness.  Measured at a point in time, HRQOL is usually lower the worse the 
patient’s health state.  The answer on what happens to HRQOL if an illness lasts over 
several time periods is less straightforward.  As documented in the quality of life literature, 
patients’ own valuation of their health states can improve over time, even if the underlying 
illness and the state of health experienced stay the same, a phenomenon called positive 
adaptation or response shift (Howard et al., 1979; Schwartz and Sprangers 1999; 2000 
Postulart & Adang, 2000; Bernhard, 2004; Kostopoulou, 2006; Goldberg, 2006; Dolan and 
Kahneman, 2007).  Therefore, if patients’ own valuations - as their health is experienced 
through time - are used in cost effectiveness analyses, then positive adaptation may 
introduce a downward bias in the effectiveness of treatment.   
 
On the other hand, examples of the opposite, negative adaptation by patients, are not very 
common in the literature2, although it seems quite possible that mental illness or pain may 
become increasingly burdensome with time.  Instead, the literature on ‘maximal endurable 
time’ shows that when non-patients are asked to imagine themselves living with a moderate 
to severe disability, peoples’ valuation of the same health state typically decline with 
duration (Sutherland et al, 1982; Stalmeier et al, 1996).  Therefore, if hypothetical 
valuations obtained from the general public for different durations were used in cost 
effectiveness analyses, then anticipated negative adaptation introduces an upward bias in 
the effectiveness of treatment.  It is not the purpose of this paper to debate whether or not 
health state valuations should reflect different durations, or whether health state valuations 
ought be obtained from patients or from the general public; suffice for our purpose here is 
to show that both positive and negative adaptation are real concerns (although, not at the 
same time).   
 
Returning to our hypothetical example, we assume that the sick state has a HRQOL of 0.5.  
If the individual stays sick after the initial time period, we consider three straightforward 
                                               
2 One example is a study on positive and negative adaptation to fibromyalgia (Lindberg, 2002).   
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scenarios: no adaptation (constant HRQOL over the course of an illness); positive 
adaptation (increasing HRQOL over time); and negative adaptation (decreasing HRQOL) 
and provide hypothetical HRQOL for each (see Table 1).  The values are generated by a 
logarithmic function and are assumed to approach 1 (for positive adaptation) and 0 (for 
negative adaptation) for an illness lasting over the 9 time periods.  For illustration purposes 
we assume monotonically increasing/ decreasing functions, but our argument can in 
principle be extended to more complex HRQOL profiles over time.   
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
We assume that the overall burden of illness is the same in each of the three scenarios, but 
distributed differently over individuals, and over time.  We only calculate aggregate 
QALYs for the 20 sick individuals.  For high mobility, aggregate QALYs for the 9 time 
periods and the subgroup of sick individuals are equal to 90 (20 individuals * 0.5 HRQOL 
* 9 time periods, see Table 2).  Aggregate QALYs are 90 independent of whether 
adaptation is positive, negative or none, because no patient ever suffers from an illness 
beyond one time period so adaptation cannot occur.  Thus, for subgroups with high levels 
of health mobility, adaptation is less of a concern.   
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
In the case of no mobility, the amount of aggregate QALYs depends on the type of 
adaptation present.  First, if individuals do not adapt (positively or negatively) to their 
illness, aggregate QALYs are 90.  This is the same result as for the case of high mobility, 
although now, illness is distributed very differently across individuals within our sample as 
the same individuals stay sick over the course of the 9 time periods.  If no mobility is 
coupled with positive adaptation, however, aggregate QALYs are 152 (20 individuals * 
(0.5+0.63+0.78+…+0.99 HRQOL) due to increasing HRQOL over time.  For negative 
adaptation, aggregate QALYs are only 28 (20 individuals * (0.5+0.37+0.22+…+0.01) 
HRQOL) due to decreasing HRQOL.   
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For intermediate health mobility, aggregate QALYs again depend on the type of adaptation.  
The values are 121 (10 individuals * (0.5+0.63+0.78+…+0.99) HRQOL + 10 individuals * 
0.5 HRQOL * 9 time periods) for positive adaptation and 59 (10 individuals * 
(0.5+0.37+0.22+…+0.01) HRQOL + 10 individuals * 0.5 HRQOL * 9 time periods) for 
negative adaptation.  Comparing these results with high mobility, we can see that the results 
for intermediate mobility are somewhat mediated by the fact that only half of the sick 
individuals stay sick over the whole observation period, whereas the other half is made up 
of those experiencing ill health for one time period only.  Again, aggregate QALYs are 90 
if there is no adaptation, as for high mobility.   
 
 
Health mobility and resource allocation: A hypothetical example 
 
In our hypothetical example the proportion of sick to healthy individuals stays the same at 
each single point in time: 20 individuals are sick and 160 are healthy.  A superficial 
analysis of these numbers would result in the same aggregate QALY for each time period.  
We show, however, that different types of health mobility and adaptation can result in 
greatly different aggregate QALYs for this relatively small sample.  
 
To demonstrate the implications of health mobility with adaptation on resource allocation, 
we now return to our policy maker who wants to implement a mental health program for 
ethnic minority and low income groups.  To recap, both groups have been shown to suffer 
from the same low mental health status at a point in time, but ethnic minorities experience 
high health mobility, whereas low income groups experience low health mobility.  What do 
our scenarios above mean for resource allocation between these two subgroups? Let us, for 
the sake of simplicity, assume that intervention for these groups both achieve recovery to 
full health, and cost the same.   
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Low income and ethnic minority groups generate the same amount of aggregate QALYs 
only if there is no adaptation to illness in the low income group.  In this situation, other 
things being the same, the two groups should attract the same amount of resources, because 
potential benefits of a health intervention would be the same.  If, however, there is positive 
adaptation in the low income group, then the ethnic minorities group should attract more 
resources than the low income group.  In this case, potential benefits from a health program 
would be greater for the ethnic minorities group, because over time the low income group 
‘suffers’ less and less from an illness, in aggregate QALY terms.  However, the low income 
group should attract more resources than ethnic minorities if there was negative adaptation 
in the low income group.  Potential benefits would be higher for the low income group 
because they ‘suffer’ increasingly over time.  We see that different scenarios on health 
mobility with adaptation can have widely different resource implications, despite the fact 
that both groups suffer from the same level of ill health at a point in time.   
 
The above illustration is a simplification of the issues involved.  Individual patients with 
the same illness may have different adaptation processes and experience different HRQOL, 
and of course there may be overlaps between sub-groups.  Adaptation processes have been 
shown to be quite complex, generating distinct aggregate QALY profiles (Salomon and 
Murray 2002).  Also, health mobility is likely to be more complicated with individuals 
shifting in and out of illness over the observation period.  We assume that the costs of 
implementing the mental health program are the same for both groups, which may well not 
be the case if the causes of differing mobility affect the cost effectiveness of treatment.  
Furthermore, not all interventions in the real world achieve recovery to full health.  Taking 
account of these points will make the analysis more realistic, but also more complex, and 
may require extensive simulation.  Nevertheless, we demonstrate that policy conclusions 
can be drawn, even from the simple analysis presented above.   
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Political and ethical implications of health mobility 
 
The above illustration focuses on health outcomes.  Health mobility can also have political 
and ethical implications, which in turn may affect resource allocation.  There is debate 
concerning the ethical implications of positive adaptation, regarding whether it is fair that 
those who manage to positively adapt may, other things being equal, be given a lower 
priority in resource allocation (see for example Menzel et al, 2002).  Our example provides 
a new dimension to this debate.  It is possible that the public would regard lower health 
mobility of a sub-population as something that should be given higher priority to, when 
prevalence is the same between sub-groups.  In other words, if the same amount of disease 
burden is distributed across a defined group, it is likely that people will prefer it to be 
dispersed widely so that more people suffer a little each (high mobility) than to be 
concentrated so that a smaller number of people suffer a great deal each (low mobility).  If 
total disease burden is fixed, then high mobility is associated with shorter spells of 
sickness, and low mobility with longer spells of sickness.  The moral difficulty associated 
with positive adaptation being penalised with lower priority may be ameliorated to some 
extent with longer duration (low mobility) being awarded with higher priority.   
 
Health mobility is also likely to have political implications.  If health mobility for a 
particular illness is high, this means that a comparably large proportion of the population is 
affected.  A policy maker (possibly concerned about re-election) may want to allocate large 
amounts of resources on alleviating this illness, because it affects a large number of voters.  
On the other hand, an illness which is characterized by low health mobility may be more 
conducive to the formation of patient lobby groups which require time and a relatively 
stable member base to become politically influential.  Such strong lobby groups can have 
considerable influence on resource allocation decisions.  There may well be ethical and 
political implications of health mobility which may influence resource allocation decisions, 
possibly even in opposing directions.   
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Conclusions 
 
Studies on resource allocation tend to focus on health outcomes in subgroups of the 
population at a point in time.  We propose an innovation in suggesting that static analyses 
should be supplemented by information on health mobility of population subgroups and 
adaptation.  Increased availability of panel data and measures of long term health make this 
feasible.   
 
We show that a snap-shot of the overall distribution of health within a population at a point 
in time is not a sufficient basis for resource allocation decisions.  Two groups with the same 
aggregate health outcomes may still attract differing amounts of resources depending on 
levels of health mobility and type of adaptation.  We find that the two groups would only 
attract the same amount of resources if both experience high health mobility or do not 
experience adaptation to their illness.  Otherwise, one group would receive more resources 
than the other, despite having the same extent of ill health at a point in time.  This is 
because aggregated QALYs and potential benefits of health interventions differ.  We find 
that if health mobility is high, adaptation is no concern. Conversely for low health mobility, 
adaptation matters.  In addition, if there is no adaptation, HRQOL is the same whatever the 
degree of health mobility.  Thus, the implications of health mobility are influenced by 
adaptation and whose valuations are considered.  If patients own valuations are taken 
(which often seem to exhibit positive adaptation), groups with low mobility may be given 
lower priority because patients in that group learn to cope with their illness better than 
patients in groups with high mobility where illness is a short term phenomenon.  In this 
scenario, short-term illness would be more undesirable than long-term illness.  Conversely, 
if the general public valuations are taken (which tend to exhibit negative adaptation), 
groups with low mobility may be given higher priority because long-term illness would be 
more undesirable than short-term illness.   
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All of this has implications for cost effectiveness ratios, particularly models of 
effectiveness of interventions if the link between mobility and adaptation is not accounted 
for.  In policy terms, funding may be moved between chronic and acute illnesses, 
depending on the impact of health mobility and adaptation on cost effectiveness of 
interventions.  There may also be consequences in moving funding from treatment to 
prevention, to ameliorate effects of mobility, or in deciding how to allocate funds to an 
ageing population.  Not considering health mobility and adaptation phenomena may result 
in over or underestimating the effectiveness of health care technologies.  Clearly, more 
empirical work on health mobility, adaptation and implications for aggregate QALYs is 
required.   
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Table 1: Hypothetical HRQOL for a sick individual and three adaptation scenarios 
 
 
  Adaptation  
Time 
period none positive negative 
1 0.50 0.50 0.50 
2 0.50 0.63 0.37 
3 0.50 0.78 0.22 
4 0.50 0.86 0.14 
5 0.50 0.92 0.08 
6 0.50 0.95 0.05 
7 0.50 0.97 0.03 
8 0.50 0.98 0.02 
9 0.50 0.99 0.01 
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Table 2: Aggregate QALYs for different adaptation and health mobility scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Adaptation  
  none positive negative 
high 90 90 90 
intermediate 90 121 59 
Health  
mobility 
none 90 152 28 
